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Introduction
How an entrepreneur interacts with his or her environment is a central issue for 
entrepreneurship research (Amoako and Lyon, 2014; Lang, Fink and Kibler, 2014; Zahra, Wright 
and Abdelgawad, 2014). The entrepreneur is subject to isomorphic pressures from the 
institutional environment, which powerfully shapes how the entrepreneur perceives prevailing 
norms such as what constitutes behavioural standards and what actions are socially expected and 
acceptable (Manolova and Yan, 2002; Budak and Rajh, 2014; Vorley and Williams, 2016). In 
today’s increasingly globalised business world, many entrepreneurs cross national borders to 
foreign host countries in search of entrepreneurial opportunities (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; 
Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). These foreign entrepreneurs face a complex institutional 
environment in the sense that two sets of institutional influences—one from the home country 
and the other from the host country—affect them simultaneously. 
However, prior research has not examined the institutional multiplicities and 
complexities that face foreign entrepreneurs (Zahra, et al., 2014), who have particular 
characteristics that complicate the mechanisms of isomorphism. Unlike local entrepreneurs who 
are familiar with the host environment and well-aligned with institutional norms, foreign 
entrepreneurs are challenged in two ways: first, they must adapt to local norms within the host 
environment, which might be unfamiliar and challenging; second, foreign entrepreneurs bring 
institutional legacies from their home environments. When isomorphic mechanisms differ 
between the home and host environments, foreign entrepreneurs are challenged with isomorphic 
inconsistency. Most entrepreneurship research has focused on domestic entrepreneurs whose 
business activities are limited to one country. By contrast, international business (IB) research 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) that considers institutional multiplicities and complexities has 
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focused on multinational corporations, leaving a research gap pertaining to foreign 
entrepreneurs. In this study, we investigate the following research questions: what factors 
facilitate and what factors impede foreign entrepreneurs’ adaptation to local norms, and how 
does such norm adaptation translate into venture performance? 
The purpose of this article is to investigate these questions by focusing on the attitudinal 
adaptations of foreign entrepreneurs in host countries where corruption is pervasive. We define 
corruption as seeking private gains at the expense of public interests (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004). In many emerging economies, corruption is a prevailing norm in economic transactions 
(Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-Helmhout, and Makhija, 2017; Estrin, Korosteleva, and Mickiewicz, 
2013; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). We focus on an individual-level psychological construct—
corruption propensity, which refers to an individual’s psychological tendency or willingness to 
engage in corruption (Agbo and Iwundu, 2016; Dickel and Graeff, 2018). Corruption propensity 
is not the actual act of corruption but rather an attitude regarding how acceptable, appropriate, 
and effective an individual considers corruption to be (Dickel and Graeff, 2018). The main thesis 
of this study is that such attitudes towards corruption are influenced by isomorphic mechanisms 
of both the home and host countries, which can in turn affect the economic performance of a 
venture.
We suggest that for foreign entrepreneurs, isomorphism emerges from two different 
sources: the home and host countries. These two contexts may have different and even 
countervailing effects as foreign entrepreneurs adapt their attitudes to local norms. While the 
home country provides early education, training, and values that ‘imprint’ foreign entrepreneurs, 
these may change as they are exposed to local norms. We suggest that home country imprints 
provide isomorphic ‘stocks’ or values and attitudes which have been accumulated over time in 
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the home country. As a legacy, home country imprints are likely to persist and influence 
corruption propensity. In contrast, exposure to local norms within the host country creates 
isomorphic ‘flows’ or attitudes and values that reflect the influence of host institutions. 
Prolonged exposure to local prevailing norms will increasingly influence corruption propensity 
as foreign entrepreneurs become embedded within the host environment. We predict that 
corruption propensity has an inverted U-shaped relationship with venture performance; we test 
our hypotheses using a longitudinal, repeated-measure survey dataset of foreign entrepreneurs 
operating in nine Middle Eastern countries between 2013 and 2017. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this study fills an important void 
between the entrepreneurship and IB literature. We extend the theoretical reach of IB research on 
institutional multiplicities and complexities to include the context of foreign entrepreneurs. We 
critically analyse how foreign entrepreneurs manage institutional complexities in terms of 
corruption in the host environment. Whereas prior research on institutional isomorphism often 
assumes that this isomorphic influence is monolithic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1984), we argue 
that a significant conflict may occur between imprints from home institutions and adaptation to 
host institutions. This difference between two types of isomorphism presents challenges to 
foreign entrepreneurs, an important issue which remains under-researched in the IB field and the 
entrepreneurship literature. 
Second, our study expands the literature on international entrepreneurship. While prior 
studies of international entrepreneurs have focused on international ventures that globally expand 
their value chains (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004), our study 
complements their typology by exploring the experiences of foreign entrepreneurs who have left 
their home countries and whose entrepreneurial activities mostly take place within host 
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countries. Due to the limited scope of activities and resources of such entrepreneurial ventures, 
challenges presented by the host environment can be critical to their growth and success.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the relevant literature on isomorphism 
and corruption, particularly in the context of entrepreneurship. We then develop hypotheses 
regarding factors that facilitate or constrain attitudinal adaptation by foreign entrepreneurs. Next, 
we discuss our sample and variables. The results of regression analyses are then presented. 
Finally, we discuss the research and managerial implications of our findings. 
Literature review 
A central issue for entrepreneurship research concerns how entrepreneurs interact with 
their environments (Zahra, et al., 2014). According to organisational theory, organisations are 
‘dependent on continuing exchanges with—and constituted by—the environments in which they 
operate’ (Scott, 1998: 28). In addition to providing resources, the environment influences the 
norms, structure, and strategies of an organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1976). As organisations 
face similar environmental conditions or occupy the same niche within a population, they tend to 
be isomorphic with one another, since they face the same pressures, constraints, and resources 
from the environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1988). As an organisation becomes 
isomorphic with other organisations in its environment, such isomorphism is likely to confer 
legitimacy, which in turn enhances the likelihood of survival, growth, and success (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996). 
Since entrepreneurial firms are typically small- to medium-sized enterprises with limited 
resources, these enterprises are often more sensitive to external pressures for isomorphism 
(Amoako and Lyon, 2014; Lang, Fink, and Kibler, 2014; Zahra, et al., 2014). In emerging 
economies where institutions are less developed, entrepreneurs are more likely to use informal 
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approaches that are locally legitimate to manage entrepreneurial challenges. For example, 
Amoako and Lyon (2014) showed that exporting enterprises in Ghana prefer to use alternative 
institutions to secure business opportunities, i.e., via private channels rather than official, legal 
approaches. Lang and colleagues (2014) found that for local entrepreneurs in Central Europe, the 
effects of regulative institutions are tempered by normative and cognitive institutions. Williams 
and Vorley (2014) showed that entrepreneurs in Bulgaria are willing to engage in illegal 
approaches such as corruption to gain competitive advantage, since corruption is a widely 
accepted local norm for businesses. In many emerging economies, corruption is an important 
local business norm that can influence business practices. As a product of weak formal and 
informal institutions, corruption has been defined as the abuse of delegated power for private 
gains at the expense of public interests (Doh et al., 2003; Rodriguez, et al., 2005). Government 
officials in particular may seek monetary or non-pecuniary private gains while exercising their 
officially designated power. 
These interesting studies have adopted a comparative institutional approach by focusing 
on entrepreneurial activities in reference to a specific institutional context, i.e., domestic 
entrepreneurs. Equipped with a strong understanding of local norms, values, cultures, and other 
institutional nuances, these domestic entrepreneurs tread in their familiar territories and often do 
not experience significant difficulty in terms of adaptation or inclusion into local communities 
(Bailey and Spicer, 2007). Particularly with regard to corruption, domestic entrepreneurs are able 
to understand, appreciate, and practise specific corruption-related acts to pursue their interests 
(Budak and Rajh, 2014; Williams and Vorley, 2014). This comparative institutional approach 
has not considered the institutional challenges faced by foreign entrepreneurs who travel to and 
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reside in a foreign host country in search of entrepreneurial opportunities, which are normally 
beyond the concerns of domestic entrepreneurs. 
Isomorphic pressures can be complex for firms that extend beyond national borders. 
Businesses such as multinational corporations (MNCs) face multiple country-level institutional 
environments, which respectively have their own sets of regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
domains (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). The MNC management must establish the legitimacy of 
the whole and of its constituent parts in the midst of such multiplicities and varieties in 
institutional environments (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Foreign entrepreneurs are faced with 
similar forms of institutional multiplicities and complexities. Foreign entrepreneurs must manage 
the liability of ‘foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995). At the same time, foreign entrepreneurs must 
understand the complexities associated with multiple institutional environments that require 
different approaches to institutional isomorphism. Compared to MNCs, which can marshal 
substantial resources, foreign entrepreneurs are smaller in size and more limited in resources, 
meaning that institutional multiplicities and complexities may impact them more than MNCs. 
However, current mainstream IB research has not embraced such issues of complexities affecting 
foreign entrepreneurs. 
In summary, foreign entrepreneurs must deal with institutional multiplicities and 
complexities, an issue that has been neglected in prior research. The entrepreneurship research 
has mostly examined domestic entrepreneurs, while IB research has focused on MNCs. This is 
the research opportunity we embrace in this study. We seek to depart from prior research by 
moving beyond a comparative institutional approach and examining how such institutional 
multiplicities affect foreign entrepreneurs. We aim to appreciate complexities involving multiple 
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sources of isomorphic pressures, particularly when corruption is a salient and relevant norm in 
emerging economies.
Hypothesis development
Institutional isomorphism: Stock and flow inconsistency
Isomorphic pressures are complex. This complexity can result from multiple contexts in 
which an organisation finds itself. For example, as an organisation diversifies into a new 
business, the new business context presents new requirements in terms of institutional norms and 
expectations that require the organisation to make internal adaptations from previous practices 
(Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 1991). The search for external legitimacy can therefore result in 
inconsistent beliefs (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Aunno, et al., 1991). Similarly, such inconsistent 
pressures of isomorphism are shown to influence the parent-subsidiary relationship, as some 
corporate venture capitalists establish new subsidiaries in overseas markets that present different 
isomorphic requirements (Soutitaris, Zerbinati, and Liu, 2012). For subunits, competing 
institutional forces come from parents and the industry or markets in which they seek to operate, 
where institutional inconsistency is uncoordinated and cannot converge towards a single logic 
(Soutitaris, et al., 2012). 
For foreign entrepreneurs, institutional inconsistency may result from differences 
between home and host environments. In both environments, isomorphic pressures require that 
foreign entrepreneurs assimilate values, norms, and attitudes from external environments 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1984). However, isomorphism in these two environments may affect 
foreign entrepreneurs via different mechanisms and produce different effects. Isomorphism in the 
home country affects foreign entrepreneurs as the ‘stock’ of institutionalised norms, values and 
beliefs, which often take time to accumulate, much like strategic asset stocks that are 
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accumulated over time (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Values and norms are persistent and can be 
passed on from one generation to another through the socialisation of community members into 
societal norms (Robertson and Crittendon, 2003; Bailey and Spicer, 2007). The home 
institutional environment in which an individual was born and raised is likely to have a strong 
and long-lasting effect on the person’s beliefs and attitudes (Bailey and Spicer, 2007). Foreign 
entrepreneurs are educated in early imprints of ethical attitudes regarding right or wrong and 
other deeply rooted belief systems. As Dierickx and Cool (1989) described in their seminal 
study, stocks cannot be quickly adjusted due to the lengthy process of accumulation involved. It 
is difficult to change or eradicate the influence of institutional imprints carried from an 
individual’s early childhood.
Isomorphism in the host country, by contrast, influences foreign entrepreneurs as ‘flows’ 
of new values and norms. Flows refer to new increments (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). In the host 
country, foreign entrepreneurs are often exposed to a different set of local norms, ethical 
standards, ideas, and practices. These norms can be shown and understood via contact with local 
business partners, government officials, professional associations, and other business-relevant 
communities (Bailey and Spicer, 2007). Individuals are liable to change their attitudes, 
particularly when external institutional pressures are strong and consistent (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). 
Foreign entrepreneurs are simultaneously subject to two types of isomorphism—stocks 
and flows. Stocks of backward-looking isomorphic imprints represent historical legacies of the 
home country environment. Home country imprints are often persistent, and their influences can 
continue to affect how the foreign entrepreneur cognitively processes information and makes 
decisions. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) found that the effects of home institutions 
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can persist even when foreigners have gone to other countries. At the same time, foreign 
entrepreneurs live and work in the local host environment, where flows of isomorphic pressures 
influences how foreign entrepreneurs interact with local communities. While stock influences of 
home country isomorphism are backward-looking, the flow impacts of host country isomorphism 
are current and forward-looking. These isomorphic pressures can sometimes be inconsistent with 
each other in providing behavioural and moral guidelines to foreign entrepreneurs. 
Stock and flow isomorphism in relation to corruption
In many emerging economies, corruption is one of the most significant institutional 
norms that affect business transactions and entrepreneurship (Budak and Rajh, 2014; Manolova 
and Yan, 2002; Vorley and Williams, 2016). Foreign entrepreneurs differ in their attitudes 
towards corruption; some are more comfortable with corruption while others must make efforts 
to adapt. This variance of attitudes, behavioural intentions, and moral tolerance of corruption has 
been referred to as corruption propensity or as an individual’s willingness or tendency to engage 
in corruption (Agbo and Iwundu, 2016; Dickel and Graeff, 2018). From a rational choice 
perspective, Dickel and Graeff (2018) suggest that this propensity depends on a rational 
calculation of expected economic gains and the probability of corruption being successful. This 
rational decision-making also depends on the individual’s attitudes towards social norms and 
moral values where the pressures of social norms reward conforming behaviours and sanction 
those who do not conform (Dickel and Graeff, 2018). Whereas it is clear that social norms affect 
the rational calculation of risks and returns of engaging in corruption (North, 1990), the question 
concerns how this process operates. In the particular case of foreign entrepreneurs, we are 
interested in how multiple forms of isomorphic pressures can impact corruption propensity. 
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As foreign entrepreneurs come from home countries with different levels of corruption, 
their stocks of isomorphic legacies or prior understanding and tolerance of corruption may differ. 
The home country provides early sources of and standards for ethical evaluation (Bailey and 
Spicer, 2007). For example, countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. have passed laws that 
specifically forbid companies from these home countries to bribe in a host environment, e.g., the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Sweden, and Norway 
are also often perceived to have lower levels of corruption, and they have been reported by 
Transparency International as having high scores on the corruption perception index (CPI) 
(Godinaz and Liu, 2015). Foreign entrepreneurs from these home countries are educated to 
believe that corruption is morally incorrect and sometimes incriminating, which may be 
inconsistent with the local norms of emerging economies with high levels of corruption. When 
foreign entrepreneurs come from home countries with lower levels of corruption (high CPI 
scores), their prior stocks of understanding of corruption may constrain their adaptation to a 
high-corruption environment. 
By contrast, countries such as Sudan, Libya or Somalia may imprint their entrepreneurs 
with different values and norms regarding corruption. Transparency International ranks these 
countries with lower CPI numbers, indicating higher levels of corruption. Individuals from these 
countries may bring with them prior knowledge of corruption tactics. Budak and Rajh (2014) 
found that entrepreneurs with prior experiences with corruption tend to justify corruption as 
‘greasing the wheels’, demonstrating an important variance shaped by countries of origin. These 
individuals are more likely to consider corruption as an acceptable and effective approach to 
solving business problems, leading to higher scores for corruption propensity. As these 
individuals come to other emerging economies with corruption issues, their adaptation to local 
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norms should occur more easily than the adaptation for those from countries such as the U.S., the 
U.K., or Sweden. In other words, foreign entrepreneurs from these countries bring with them 
higher ‘stocks’ of understanding of corruption. Home country imprints, when foreign 
entrepreneurs come from corrupt countries with lower CPI scores, facilitate the adaptation of 
foreign entrepreneurs to local norms of corruption in other emerging economies. 
H1: The effects of home country imprints depend on the corruption level of the home 
country: foreign entrepreneurs from home countries of lower CPI have higher corruption 
propensity; foreign entrepreneurs from home countries of higher CPI have lower corruption 
propensity. 
Flow isomorphism, as discussed above, refers to the recent situational influence of the 
current environment on attitudes and understandings of foreign entrepreneurs. More specifically 
for our context, flow isomorphic influences come from the host country, where corruption as a 
norm is widely accepted. Attitudes may change depending on the circumstances and the broader 
environment in which individuals find themselves (Underwood, 2008). Helmke and Levitsky 
(2004) consider the learning of norms and other informal institutions as a process of social 
learning involving trial and error. Local corruption norms may pressure individuals to conform 
via normative, coercive, and mimetic mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1984). Exposure to 
local values and norms may gradually affect the attitudes of foreign entrepreneurs.  
Such learning processes may take time and particularly when there are culture-specific 
nuances for foreign entrepreneurs to learn and understand. As local norms are assimilated into 
individuals’ business practices, these norms may be ‘taken for granted’, resulting in flow 
isomorphism achieving its effects. When a venture experiences longer exposure to local norms, 
foreign entrepreneurs are able to acquire more understanding of local norms regarding 
corruption. The longer history of the venture would mitigate the initial liability of outsidership 
(Fiedler et al., 2017) or foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). More experiences with the corrupt host 
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environment may allow entrepreneurs to develop locally oriented business practices, routines and 
capabilities. More learning associated with an older venture would increase, on average, the level 
of corruption propensity of foreign entrepreneurs.
H2: The corruption propensity of the foreign entrepreneur increases with a venture’s age. 
Corruption propensity and performance
A high level of corruption propensity has both benefits and costs for a venture’s 
performance. A higher degree of corruption propensity mentally prepares foreign entrepreneurs 
for corrupt transactions in the local environment and reduces possible cognitive dissonance or 
resentment against corrupt officials or behaviours. Corrupt transactions allow foreign 
entrepreneurs to circumnavigate obstacles that arise due to corruption in the local environment 
(Alon and Hageman, 2013). They may ‘buy their way’ as solutions to some problems by, for 
instance, mobilising resources, obtaining loans, winning orders, and coping with bureaucratic 
constraints (Jong et al., 2012). To ‘grease the wheels’, resources spent on corruption can be 
considered investments that allow foreign entrepreneurs to operate successfully in a corrupt host 
environment (Peng and Heath, 1996), where a higher level of corruption propensity may enhance 
enterprise performance. 
Costs of corruption may also increase with corruption propensity, and may increase even 
more than benefits. Corruption is a costly social vice that means extra costs for entrepreneurs 
(Doh, et al., 2003). According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the cost of corruption is typically 10% of the transaction value, where a middleman often takes a 
cut while the remainder goes to a government official (Henning, 2016). Corrupt officials may 
seek ‘rent’ and use the entrepreneur as an extra source of income. Maintaining amicable 
relationships with corrupt officials can be expensive. Corruption sometimes involves social 
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activities with corrupt officials in a public setting or at private parties, where the time and 
expenses spent on social exchanges can be substantial. Corruption may feed into officials’ 
appetites for more payment without enforceable reciprocity, causing the marginal return of 
corruption to decline. 
The deleterious effects of corruption on a venture are often less immediate or visible, but 
they may still affect the venture’s fundamental strengths in the long run. The entrepreneur could 
have used the time and money to improve the efficiency or resource base of the enterprise by 
training or marketing, whereas corruption can crowd out these efforts (Jong et al., 2012). 
Corruption lowers incentives for investments in innovation and for other complex economic 
activities where payoffs are not certain or are temporally distant (Baker, et al., 2005). The 
positive effects of corruption in terms of access to key resources can be offset by the inefficient 
allocation of resources (Jong et al., 2012). Therefore, the benefits of corruption should increase 
venture performance, but the costs associated with corruption propensity may also increase and 
even supersede the benefits. 
H3: Corruption propensity has an inverted U-shaped relationship with venture 
performance. 
Methods
Sample
Our sample includes nine Arab League members as host countries—Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). These countries are selected for several reasons. First, corruption is a 
widespread phenomenon in Arabic-speaking countries (Hafez, 2009; Tomass, 2012; Touati, 
2014). Corruption in these countries finds its historical roots in a culture of factionalism (Hafez, 
2009) and sectarianism (Tomass, 2012) where people concern themselves more with local 
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parochial interests rather than with a unified national goal, weakening the authority of 
government agencies as formal institutions. Legal institutions, in the Western sense of the rule of 
law, are less developed because legal entities are more puppets than real decision-making 
entities. Corruption provides a ‘useful’ alternative, as no accountability, responsibility, or 
transparency can generally be found (Hafez, 2009; Touati, 2014). Corruption distorts economic 
structures in Arabic countries and erodes moral standards (Hafez, 2009). Therefore, these Arabic 
countries provide an appropriate setting for studying the impacts of corruption.
Second, these countries share the same religion, culture and history, providing a good 
control for unobserved variances that may relate to other informal institutions. From an 
accounting point of view, Arab League members are supportive of International Public Sector 
Accounting Financial Standards (IPSAS), international accounting standards that provide a 
global language of accounting, in requiring firms to report their financial performance. Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have either officially adopted IPSAS or are in the 
process of doing so (Deloitte, 2016). This broad adoption of IPSAS enhances the compatibility 
and reliability of the performance results reported in this study.
Third, these countries, while very similar, vary considerably on the dimension of 
corruption. Transparency International, a prestigious watchdog that monitors corruption 
throughout the world, rates all countries on corruption every year on a scale of one hundred (the 
least corrupt) to one (the most corrupt). According to Transparency International, the least 
corrupt country in our sample is the UAE, which is rated at 71, and the most corrupt is Lebanon, 
which is rated at 27. The mean of the sampled countries is 45, which is roughly the midrange of 
all countries. Our sample includes desirable variances of corruption at the country level. We 
present the CPI scores in Table 1.
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-------Insert Table 1 here-------
We collected our data from several sources. To construct control variables for the home 
and host countries in our sample, we collected institutional variables from multiple sources, 
including the World Bank, Transparency International, the World Economic Forum, and the 
Lauder Institute.  
Our primary data source was a survey of foreign entrepreneurs administered by the 
Economic and Social Council of the Arab League countries, which is a joint institution that 
coordinates economic integration among Arab-speaking countries. The survey was created to 
understand what drives corrupt business transactions—the individuals themselves or the business 
environment. To facilitate anti-corruption campaigns within these Arabic countries, the survey is 
administered annually to provide updated information. The structure of the survey is very similar 
to data on corruption collected by the World Bank and prior studies (Cull and Xu, 2005; Iriyama, 
Kishore and Talukdar, 2016). 
An electronic survey was conducted in either English or Arabic during annual business 
licence renewal. The administrators of the survey took several steps to enhance the integrity of 
the data: 
1) The survey was administered anonymously and did not collect primary personal 
information, such as names or addresses. 
2) Survey respondents were guaranteed that their answers to the survey would not be 
used against them in a court of law or to instigate criminal investigations against them. 
3) The questions were randomly assigned to individual respondents. For example, 
respondent 1 may have seen Q1, Q2, and Q3 and then Q9, Q6, and Q4 and so on. However, 
Page 16 of 45
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ISBJ
International Small Business Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
another respondent may have seen these questions in a different random order, minimising issues 
such as bias. 
4) To check for any irregularities in the survey answers, the administration system 
recorded the amount of time each respondent took to complete the survey. The administrators 
then reviewed each survey answer carefully and examined response times to determine whether 
the answers were genuine. Generally, respondents spent 14 minutes answering all of the survey 
questions on average. When a person completed the survey in less than 14 minutes, 
administrators checked for problems, and when they found any, they removed corresponding 
responses from the database. 
The surveys provided repeated measures from 2013 to 2017, as the same entrepreneurs 
responded annually during the business license renewal period. Survey collections began in 2013 
and the council took several steps to arrive at the current number of observations in the sampling 
phase. First, the survey was attached to all new business licence applications in the nine host 
countries. The council limited the survey’s scope to newly established firms with no prior local 
environment-related influence in 2013, with 55,876 surveys administered. Second, the council 
targeted sole proprietors, reducing the sample to 22,933 newly established firms with sole 
proprietors. Third, the survey also provided a ‘no response’ option next to each survey question, 
which reduced the sample to 10,756 surveys.  
After removing surveys with irregularities, the sample included 2,215 individuals, 
representing a 21% response rate. We then removed responses from local entrepreneurs, as the 
focus of this study was on foreign entrepreneurs, resulting in a final sample of 989 foreign 
respondents in our sample. We analysed the distribution of the foreign entrepreneurs based on 
their home country information. We present the distribution information in Table 2, including the 
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number of entrepreneurs from the same country, corresponding percentages in the sample, the 
CPI of each home country, and whether a home country also happens to be one of the nine host 
countries. While one might expect most entrepreneurs in the sample to be from countries 
bordering the host nations, the sample is quite diverse, as the entrepreneurs came from 60 
countries. India had the largest number of entrepreneurs, with 171 or 17.29% of the sample, 
followed by the U.K. with 110 individuals or 11.12% of the sample. Among the nine Middle 
Eastern native countries, Qatar had 32 entrepreneurs working in other countries followed by 
Egypt with 21 individuals. In other words, most entrepreneurs in our sample came from outside 
the region. Similarly, considerable diversity was also found in terms of the CPIs of home 
countries among the ‘least corrupt’ countries such as New Zealand and Denmark (CPI of 90) 
followed by Finland (CPI of 89) and countries at the low end of the CPI such as Somalia (CPI of 
10), Libya (CPI of 14), and Syria (CPI of 13). 
-------Insert Table 2 here-------
 We compared the respondents to the non-respondents to determine whether they were 
significantly different. Because our sample is composed of panel data for which respondents 
repeatedly participated as our sample, thus violating the t-test independence assumption (Pandis, 
2016), we conducted F-tests with observations clustered around host countries. The F-test based 
on venture size generated an F value of 0.45 with a probability value of 0.52, showing no 
statistically significant difference between the respondent sample and non-respondents. 
Similarly, we obtained an F-value of 0.09 with a probability of 0.7 when the distinction between 
respondents and non-respondents was based on profits divided by sales of ventures. The tests 
show no significant difference between them. The final sample is thus an unbalanced panel 
dataset. 
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We present summary statistics on the sampled respondents in Table 3. Among the 
respondents, 86% were male, and 14% were female. Individuals between 20 and 29 years of age 
formed the largest age group at 40%. The cohorts aged 30 to 39 and 40 to 50 each represented 
22% of the sample. Those older than 50 formed the smallest group at 13%. The size of ventures 
ranged from 4 to 16 with 53% of ventures employing 6 to 10 people, 32% of ventures with fewer 
than five employees, and 15% of ventures with between 11 and 16 employees. The entrepreneurs 
came from seven different industries: construction (18%), import/export (19%), real estate 
(21%), consulting (11%), general trade (13%), tourism (2%), and IT (15%). The respondents 
responded to the same surveys administered every year, allowing us to use an unbalanced panel 
dataset across years. 
-------Insert Table 3 here-------
Dependent Variable
We used the annual sales (in U.S. Dollars) of each venture as the dependent variable. For 
entrepreneurial firms, sales provide relevant information for evaluating the viability and growth 
of ventures. This variable was taken from the financial section of the survey. Because the survey 
was completed at the same time as business license renewal, this number had to be consistent 
with official business performance data. While this variable was taken from a survey, the process 
of collection helped ensure that the variable was objective. We then log-transformed this variable 
in our regressions.
Explanatory Variable
To predict H1 from the home country corruption level, we used the CPI, which is 
annually published by Transparency International (Godinez and Liu, 2015). The index is 
calculated based on perceived levels of corruption. A high index score indicates a relatively low 
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level of corruption whereas a more corrupt country has a low index score. We expect individuals 
from less corrupt home countries, i.e., those with relatively high CPI scores, to exhibit lower 
levels of corruption propensity while those from more corrupt home countries should exhibit 
higher levels of corruption propensity. This variable is expected to be negatively related to 
corruption propensity. In empirical tests not reported here, we also used alternative measures 
with data from the World Bank and obtained similar results. These results are available upon 
request.
To test H2, we used a venture age variable. Because the survey was first administered to 
ventures newly formed in 2013, the ages of ventures increased in our sample period from 1 to 5 
(in 2017). The purpose was to test whether the passage of time is accompanied by an increase in 
corruption propensity. This variable can capture the effects of time. While the dataset does not 
provide information on how long an entrepreneur has worked in a host country, the length of 
time since a venture’s founding provides the best available proxy for exposure to the host 
country environment. 
A measure of corruption propensity should reflect cost/benefit deliberation and norm 
internalisation (Dickel and Graeff, 2018). We used survey items based on prior research on 
corruption propensity (Agbo and Iwundu, 2016; Dickel and Graeff, 2018; Iriyama et al., 2016;) 
with survey items measuring entrepreneurs’ perceptions of corruption, its effect on their 
ventures, and their propensity to engage in corruption to further their ventures (see Appendix 1 
for further details). The emphasis of this construct is not on the actual act of corruption, but on 
attitudes towards corruption or tendencies to engage in corruption (Agbo and Iwundu, 2016; 
Dickel and Graeff, 2018). Items contained such statements as “I actively gauge people's 
propensity to engage in corruption through the disclosure of possible profits of potentially 
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corrupt deals” and “I actively exploit people's willingness to increase their personal income by 
accentuating the potential income from corrupt opportunities.”. Using the eleven items, we 
conducted a multilevel exploratory factor analysis involving three steps to account for the 
repeated measures and longitudinal nature of the survey items (Reise, Ventura, Nuechterlein and 
Kim, 2005). The process involved applying a regular exploratory factor, calculating intraclass 
correlations for each of the eleven items, and portioning the total correlation matrix into a ‘within 
and between’ component (Reise et al., 2005). The analyses reveal a Cronbach α of 0.97, 
suggesting high reliability. We used this factor as our measure of corruption propensity. A higher 
score indicates a stronger attitude in favour of corruption while a lower score denotes a less 
receptive attitude.
Control Variables
We applied several firm-, individual-, industry-, and country-level variables as control 
variables. The firm-level control variable was venture size, measured by the number of 
employees employed by a firm. Individual-level control variables included the number of 
contacts each entrepreneur has dealt with in the host country, such as officials or middlemen 
(Miller, Steier and Breton-Miller, 2016) and entrepreneurial experience prior venture, which is 
measured as the number of prior ventures the entrepreneur has undertaken (Toft-Kehler, 
Wennberg and Kim, 2014). We also controlled for the entrepreneur’s age. We included two 
industry control variables. The first is the Industry Growth Rate of the Host Country to account 
for industry munificence, as industries that grow rapidly indicate a favourable environment and a 
low need for corruption (Zhou, Han, and Wang, 2013). The second variable is the Industry 
Percentage of the Host Country GDP to control for the importance of a given industry in the host 
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country. We also controlled the Host Country GDP Change to measure the economic growth of 
the host country. 
Next, we created several institution-level variables. The informal economy distance 
variable was created from Schneider and Williams’ (2013) informal economy measure. 
Schneider and Williams (2013) estimated the sizes of informal economies of 162 countries (Frey 
and Weck-Hannemann, 1984), including monetary (cash) and labour market indicators such as 
the labour force participation rate. The informal economy was estimated as a percentage of the 
sampled countries’ official GDP values. We subtracted the home country informal economy 
level from the host country informal economy level to create the informal economy distance 
variable. We controlled for informal economy distance, as most corrupt transactions are cash-
based and should end up in the informal economy (Mathias, Lux, Crook, Autry and Zaretzki, 
2015). 
Furthermore, we created a general institutional distance variable between the home and 
host countries from the annual economic, financial and administrative distance variables 
developed by Berry and Colleagues (2010). These variables denote how two countries are 
institutionally different on a variety of dimensions (Berry et al., 2010), and we considered three 
important dimensions—economic, administrative, and financial distance. Since these variables 
are highly correlated, we used a factor analysis to reduce the data and generated a single factor—
general institutional distance. All models controlled for fixed effects of the nine host Arabic 
countries. 
Empirical Strategy
We took several steps to execute our empirical analyses. First, we examined the effects of 
home country corruption level (H1) and temporal isomorphism (H2) on corruption propensity for 
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individual entrepreneurs. Following the prior literature, we examined effects of the gender of 
entrepreneurs, their age, and prior venturing experiences; the industry growth rate in the host 
country; the industry percentage of the host country’s GDP; and host country’s change in GDP. 
The rationale is that males tend to bribe more than females (Agbo and Iwundu, 2016). More 
corruption is expected for older entrepreneurs and for those with more venturing experience. 
When an industry grows fast, performance pressure may be lower and lead to less corruption to 
‘grease the wheels’. A growing economy puts less pressure on entrepreneurs to engage in 
corruption. The outcome of this process is the generation of a predicted value of corruption 
propensity to be used in the second stage of the two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure (Haans, 
Pieters, and He, 2016). 
In the second stage of the 2SLS procedure, we used the predicted value of corruption 
propensity to predict the performance variable (H3). Here, we first ran regressions within one 
level using STATA’s xtreg command because we had an unbalanced panel dataset while we 
fixed the country-level variables. To account for multiple levels in our data (individual 
entrepreneurs being the first level and the host countries the second level), we next used 
STATA’s xtmixed tool to examine our panel dataset via two-level hierarchical linear modelling 
(HLM), as our country-level variables were of the second level while our individual and firm-
level variables were of the first level. Five variables used in the first stage were not covered in 
the second stage (venture age, gender, industry growth, and industry percentage of GDP) to be 
consistent with standards of 2SLS use (Bowden and Turkington, 1984).
Results
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics. Table 5 presents the correlations for all 
variables. Most correlations are lower than 0.5, alleviating concerns of multicollinearity. For all 
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models reported, we checked all OLS versions for the size of VIFs. The only variable with a VIF 
of over 10 is Entrepreneur Age, which we needed to remove from the regression analyses. All 
other VIFs are below 3, suggesting that multicollinearity is not present.
-----Insert Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here-----
Table 6 presents regression results for H1 and H2, the antecedents of corruption 
propensity. In Model 1, which shows effects of the control variables, entrepreneurs who are 
male, have more prior venturing experience, and with more business contacts often exhibit high 
degrees of corruption propensity. The industry growth rate reduces corruption propensity. A 
positive host country GDP change lowers corruption propensity, and a higher industry growth 
rate lowers corruption propensity. Model 2 includes home country CPI values to test H1. The 
coefficient is negative with a p value of less than 0.001, supporting H1. As predicted by H1, 
entrepreneurs from less corrupt home countries (higher CPI values) exhibit lower levels of 
corruption propensity whereas entrepreneurs from more corrupt countries (lower CPI values) 
show higher levels of corruption propensity. Model 3 accounts for venture age to show the 
temporal change in corruption propensity. The coefficient of venture age is positive and the p 
value is below 0.001, supporting H2. Model 4 accounts for both home country CPI and venture 
age, confirming the results of prior models. We used Model 4 to generate a predicted value of 
corruption propensity. We call this variable corruption propensity hat and use it in the second 
stage of the 2SLS model.
-----Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here-----
Table 7 shows single-level analyses of how corruption propensity influences venture 
sales. At this individual level, we include dummy variables for each host country as fixed effects. 
Model 1 includes all control variables where more business contacts and prior venturing 
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experiences increase profits while a larger venture size decreases sales. Model 2 includes the 
corruption propensity hat, which is positive and significant with a p value of below 0.001. Model 
3 includes the squared term of the corruption propensity hat, which is negative and significant 
with a p value below 0.001. Model 3 supports H3, showing that corruption propensity has an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with sales. Figure 3 shows the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between corruption propensity and sales as described by H3. The curve first rises as corruption 
propensity increases. The curve peaks at a propensity factor of 0.6 with log sales at roughly 12.2. 
Then, as corruption propensity continues to increase from 0.6 to 1, the curve starts to drop and 
sales decrease. 
-----Insert Figure 1 about here-----
Table 8 shows HLM analyses of both the individual and country levels. Country-level 
variables are random at the second level, including informal economy distance and general 
institutional distance. The first level analyses include the same set of variables as that applied in 
Table 7 with the only difference being that country fixed effects are removed. Model 1 includes 
all controls and the effects are consistent with those shown in Table 7. Models 2 and 3 
incrementally add the corruption propensity hat and its quadratic term. The results are also very 
consistent with corresponding results given in Table 7. In Model 2, the coefficient of the 
corruption propensity hat is positive and significant at below the 0.001 level. Model 3 shows the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption propensity and profits. The coefficient of the 
corruption propensity hat is positive and significant at the 0.001 level while the squared term is 
negative and significant at the 0.001 level, supporting H3. 
Discussion 
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Isomorphism is an important mechanism through which the environment influences 
entrepreneurship. For foreign entrepreneurs who cross national borders in search of 
entrepreneurial opportunities in a different host country, this external influence of isomorphism 
may take on more complex forms and mechanisms than those within the home country. In this 
study, we focus on how foreign entrepreneurs react to pressures of corruption under institutional 
multiplicities, i.e., from both home and host countries. Our results confirm our thesis that foreign 
entrepreneurs are subject to the influences of both home and host environments. While host 
country institutions represent current isomorphic pressures on foreign entrepreneurs, home 
country institutions provide ‘stocks’ or legacies, whose influences may persist beyond national 
borders. 
From novel panel survey data collected from the Middle East we find that home countries 
leave important ‘imprints’ on foreign entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs from countries with higher 
CPI values exhibit lower levels of corruption propensity whereas those from countries with 
lower CPI values exhibit higher levels of corruption propensity. At the same time, corruption 
propensity increases as a venture grows older, indicating that foreign entrepreneurs adapt to local 
norms and become isomorphic with the host environment over time. Our results show that 
corruption propensity has an inverted U-shaped relationship with venture performance.  
Research contributions and implications 
Our study makes a unique contribution by connecting IB research on institutional 
complexities with the context of entrepreneurship. Whereas much entrepreneurship research has 
discussed the issue of corruption, most of these studies only focus on domestic entrepreneurs 
whose business activities are limited to one country. We extend the IB literature on institutional 
multiplicities and complexities (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) to the context of foreign 
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entrepreneurship by highlighting the challenges created by multiple and sometimes conflicting 
institutional pressures. We fill this important gap between the entrepreneurship research and IB 
literature by analysing how foreign entrepreneurs can deal with institutional complexities 
regarding corruption in the host country. We suggest that societal imprints from home countries 
can serve as ‘stock’ isomorphism, whose effects may persist beyond national borders. When 
foreign entrepreneurs come to a host country where corruption is socially acceptable, this ‘flow’ 
of isomorphism that occurs through conformance with norms of the host environment may 
gradually change their attitudes towards corruption. We extend prior research by highlighting the 
institutional inconsistencies posed by stock and flow isomorphic mechanisms. Whereas prior 
research on institutional isomorphism has often assumed that this isomorphic influence is 
monolithic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1984), our study shows the potential for significant conflict 
between ‘stock’ and ‘flow’ isomorphic pressures and demonstrates that this qualitative difference 
between the two presents important challenges to foreign entrepreneurs. 
Our research also contributes to international entrepreneurship. Prior research on 
international entrepreneurship has been primarily interested in how entrepreneurs strategically 
internalise the global market in pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities. Some international 
entrepreneurship research focuses on how value chain activities can be strategically configured 
and internalised (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994), while other studies examine those ‘born-globals’ 
who, from the very beginning, pursue a vision of becoming global without any domestic or 
international preparation (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). Our study complements these studies by 
examining foreign entrepreneurs whose activities are geographically confined in the foreign host 
environment. Our study contributes a new aspect to the typology of international 
entrepreneurship. The unique theoretical insights we offer here centre on how such institutional 
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setups present unique challenges to foreign entrepreneurs that have not yet been examined by 
prior international entrepreneurship research.
The notion of corruption propensity denotes a psychological tendency or behavioural 
intention, which is a useful complement to institution-level concepts. For individual 
entrepreneurs, such willingness to engage in corruption is a double-edged sword. On one hand, a 
certain level of corruption propensity is useful and can benefit a venture, as corruption helps to 
‘grease the wheels’. On the other hand, corruption constitutes a short-term solution to 
performance problems because it diverts entrepreneurs’ attention from long-term goals such as 
R&D, marketing, and other strategies that contribute to sustainable competitive advantage (Jong 
et al., 2012; Xu, Zhou, and Du, 2019). Instead, corruption traps entrepreneurs in the social 
community of corrupt government officials and can encourage entrepreneurs to exploit what is 
currently available. Whereas corruption propensity presents adaptive advantages to foreign 
entrepreneurs in corrupt environments, such advantages can be temporary and exploitative (Xu et 
al., 2019). Foreign entrepreneurs become victims and perpetrators at the same time (Vorley and 
Williams, 2016), which may perpetuate the vicious cycle present in the corrupt host 
environment. Foreign entrepreneurs must therefore strike a balance between short- and long-term 
benefits when they engage in corruption.
Our study also enriches research on corruption by utilising information taken from a 
unique context. We focus our study on the Middle East, unlike prior research that has examined 
corruption in former socialist countries (Budak and Rajh, 2014; Doern and Goss, 2011). The 
Middle East presents an unconventional research context. Prior research has often found a strong 
relationship between lower per capita incomes and higher corruption levels in society (Treisman, 
2000). However, several countries included in our sample are affluent, oil-producing countries, 
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such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, which are exceptions to the rule in the sense that, 
even though they are economically rich, corruption remains an important societal issue that 
affects entrepreneurship. In this sense, it is clear that corruption at the societal level is more 
likely a function of norms, values, and cultures and not necessarily driven by the level of 
economic wealth. 
Implications for practice
From a practical point of view, our study has useful implications for foreign 
entrepreneurs. Prior research is less specific on what challenges foreign entrepreneurs are likely 
to encounter. Our study recommends that foreign entrepreneurs heed ‘fit’ issues at both the 
country and individual levels. Country-level fit concerns how the host country differs from the 
home country in terms of prevailing norms. Since norms regarding corruption are often implicit, 
foreign entrepreneurs must make special efforts to understand and be able to manoeuvre in the 
host environment. The second level is at the personal level, where foreign entrepreneurs must 
find a personal ‘fit’ with local informal institutions. Norms from home countries regarding 
corruption continue to affect foreign entrepreneurs as persistent and ‘sticky’ values. From a 
moral and ethical point of view, entrepreneurs must find a balance between seeking economic 
interests and maintaining ethical or moral standards.
Limitations and avenues for future research
One important limitation of our study is attributable to the survey data used on 
psychological propensities to engage in corruption. Our survey instrument measures perceptions, 
attitudes, and beliefs about corruption and not actual acts of corruption. The extent to which 
corruption propensity is correlated with actual acts of corruption may depend on pressures to 
conform to local norms of corruption—the stronger the pressure, the stronger the correlation 
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between psychological propensity and actual acts. Future research might benefit from more 
direct measures of actual acts of corruption than those that could be applied in the current study. 
Future research may also examine the effects of industry imprints on corruption 
propensity. Imprints are not limited to home country influences and may also include industry 
effects. For example, some prior research (Cohn et al., 2014) shows that banking employees may 
be more prone to corruption due to their industry identity. While our dataset limits our ability to 
explore this interesting question, future research may consider how such industry affiliations 
may affect entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards corruption.  
Future research may explore similar effects of norms in different contexts. While our 
focus on the Middle East provides many benefits, some idiosyncrasies of this area may limit the 
generalisability of our results. Since corruption is pervasive in many countries, future studies 
based on data from other emerging economies can provide additional insights. While we focused 
on corruption as a very relevant norm for entrepreneurs coming to the Middle East, future 
research may enrich our understanding by focusing on other types of norms. 
Conclusion
In today’s increasingly globalised business world, norm adaptation is an important issue 
for foreign entrepreneurs. This study examines how stock and flow isomorphic mechanisms 
drive the process of norm adaptation. Our study extends prior literature on entrepreneurship and 
international business by focusing on issues of institutional inconsistency and norm adaptation 
for foreign entrepreneurs. 
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Appendix 1. CORRUPTION SURVEY
1 I believe the level of government 
corruption in the country I'm 
operating in is low.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I believe the level of government 
corruption in the country I'm operating 
in is high.
2 I believe that engaging in 
corruption in a corrupt 
environment does not give me 
advantage over my competition.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I believe that engaging in corruption in 
a corrupt environment gives me 
advantage over my competition.
3 Paying bribes to other individuals 
is morally wrong, even if I make 
a profit.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Paying bribes to other individuals is 
morally acceptable, especially if I make 
a profit.
4 I do not engage in corruption in 
my home country.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I engage in corruption in my home 
country.
5 I believe that corruption does not 
add value to my business and it 
does not increase my profits.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I believe that corruption adds value to 
my business and it does increase my 
profits.
6 I rarely entice persons of interest 
with payments to secure 
worthwhile business contracts. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I actively entice persons of interest with 
payments to secure worthwhile 
business contracts. 
7 I believe that the laws and 
policies in my current 
environment hinder my ability to 
engage in corruption to maximize 
my profits.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I believe that the laws and policies in 
my current environment aid my ability 
to engage in corruption to maximize my 
profits.
8 I avoid pursuing corrupt 
opportunities to maximize my 
profits. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I actively pursue corrupt opportunities 
to maximize my profits.
9 I rarely establish corrupt industry 
contacts so that I may exploit 
corrupt opportunities.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I constantly establish corrupt industry 
contacts so that I may exploit future 
corrupt opportunities.
10 I seldom gauge people's 
propensity to engage in 
corruption through disclosure of 
possible profits of potential 
corrupt deals
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I actively gauge people's propensity to 
engage in corruption through the 
disclosure of possible profits of 
potential corrupt deals.
11 I seldom exploit people's 
willingness to increase their 
personal income by accentuating 
the potential income from corrupt 
opportunities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I actively exploit people's willingness 
to increase their personal income by 
accentuating the potential income from 
corrupt opportunities. 
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Figure 1. The inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption propensity and performance
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Table 1. CPI scores of host countries in our sample for 2013 to 2017
Country 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Bahrain 48 49 51 43 36
Egypt 32 37 36 34 32
Jordan 45 49 53 48 48
Kuwait 43 44 49 41 39
KSA 46 49 52 46 49
Lebanon 28 27 28 28 28
Oman 47 45 45 45 44
Qatar 68 69 71 61 63
UAE 69 70 70 66 71
Information source: Transparency International.
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Table 2. The distribution of foreign entrepreneurs in different home countries
Home country Home CPI No. of entrepreneurs Percentage Host country
Algeria 34 3 0.30%
Australia 79 81 8.19%
Brazil 40 4 0.40%
Canada 82 38 3.84%
Chad 20 3 0.30%
China 40 34 3.44%
Colombia 37 3 0.30%
Cyprus 55 6 0.61%
Czech Republic 55 1 0.10%
Denmark 90 9 0.91%
Egypt 34 21 2.12% 1
Finland 89 32 3.24%
France 69 18 1.82%
Georgia 57 3 0.30%
Germany 81 55 5.56%
Greece 44 29 2.93%
Hong Kong 77 7 0.71%
Hungary 48 1 0.10%
India 40 171 17.29%
Iran 29 1 0.10%
Ireland 73 18 1.82%
Italy 47 1 0.10%
Japan 72 2 0.20%
KSA 46 2 0.20% 1
Kazakhstan 29 1 0.10%
Kenya 26 6 0.61%
Korea 53 5 0.51%
Kuwait 41 1 0.10% 1
Libya 14 8 0.81%
Lithuania 59 3 0.30%
Macedonia 37 1 0.10%
Malaysia 49 1 0.10%
New Zealand 90 9 0.91%
Nigeria 28 1 0.10%
Norway 85 22 2.22%
Oman 45 5 0.51% 1
Pakistan 32 3 0.30%
Poland 62 3 0.30%
Portugal 62 3 0.30%
Qatar 61 32 3.24% 1
Romania 48 5 0.51%
Russia 29 6 0.61%
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Scotland 81 1 0.10%
Senegal 45 26 2.63%
Serbia 42 1 0.10%
Slovakia 51 2 0.20%
Slovenia 61 4 0.40%
Somalia 10 4 0.40%
South Africa 45 15 1.52%
Spain 58 4 0.40%
Sudan 14 4 0.40%
Sweden 88 17 1.72%
Switzerland 86 27 2.73%
Syria 13 11 1.11%
Tunisia 41 3 0.30%
Turkey 41 24 2.43%
UAE 66 31 3.13% 1
U.K. 81 110 11.12%
USA 74 46 4.65%
Ukraine 29 1 0.10%
Total: 989
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Table 3. Summary statistics of sampled respondents
Respondent profile %
1.Gender: 
   Male 86
   Female 14
2.Respondent age:
   20-29 years 40
   30-39 years 22
   40-49 years 22
   50 years or older 13
3. Venture size:
   1-5 employees 32
   6-10 employees 53
   11-16 employees 15
4. Industry type
   Construction
   Import/export
18
19
   Real estate 21
   Consulting 11
   General trade 13
   Tourism 2
   IT 15
   (N=4627).
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Logsales 11.68 1.09 9.33 13.51
Corruption propensity -0.001 0.98 -2.64 1.97
Home CPI 60.41 21.04 10 90
Gender 0.86 0.34 0 1
Venture size 7.25 2.88 4 16
Entrepreneur age 35.71 11.12 18 64
No. of contacts 10.61 6.13 0 28
Prior venturing 
experience
3.00 1.70 0 11
Informal economy 
distance
2.80 11.22 -46.1 28.1
General institutional 
distance
0.001 0.92 -2.46 1.97
Industry growth rate 2.09 0.96 0.1 3.6
Industry percentage in 
GDP
4.82 4.32 0.01 18
GDP change 2.67 1.83 -3.48 5.42
Venture age 2.95 1.42 1 5
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Table 5. Variable correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.Logsales
2.Corruption 
propensity
0.43
3.Home CPI -0.28 -0.41
4.Gender 0.10 0.18 -0.31
5.Venture size -0.27 -0.43 0.11 -0.07
6.Entrepreneur 
age
-0.07 -0.17 0.45 -0.16 -0.01
7.No. of contacts 0.53 0.27 -0.15 0.05 -0.16 -0.04
8.Prior venturing 
experience
0.19 0.25 -0.50 0.18 -0.07 -0.15 0.10
9.Informal 
economy 
distance
-0.13 -0.17 0.39 -0.09 0.03 0.13 -0.07 -0.25
10.General 
institutional 
distance
0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.10 0.26
11.Industry 
growth rate 
-0.15 -0.35 0.21 -0.09 0.13 0.05 -0.14 -0.11 0.06 -0.05
12.Industry 
percentage in 
GDP
-0.02 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.005 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 0.05
13. GDP change -0.33 -0.14 0.02 0.03 0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.005 0.10 0.05 0.06 -0.05
14.Venture age 0.75 0.35 -0.03 0.005 -0.32 0.10 0.46 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.28 0.002 -0.38
Correlations of larger than 0.04 are significant at or above the 0.05 level in two-tailed tests.
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Table 6. Predicting entrepreneur corruption propensity 
(1) (2) (4) (3)
VARIABLES
Home country CPI -0.01*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00)
Venture age 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01)
Gender 0.31*** 0.15*** 0.32*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Prior venturing experience 0.10*** 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of contacts 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry growth rate -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.21***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry percentage in GDP -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Host country GDP change -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Host country dummies Some 
significant
Some 
significant
Some 
significant
Some 
significant
Constant 0.00 1.39*** -0.58*** 0.82***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Observations 4,627 4,627 4,627 4,627
Number of entid 989 989 989 989
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed t-tests
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Table 7. The effects of corruption propensity on venture performance, single-level analyses
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES logsales logsales logsales
Corruption propensity hat 1.06*** 1.06***
(0.03) (0.03)
Corruption propensity hat squared -0.97***
(0.03)
Venture size -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of contacts 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prior venturing experience 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Informal economy distance -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
General institutional distance 0.02 0.02 0.04**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Host country dummies Some 
significant
Some 
significant
Some 
significant
Year dummies One 
significant
One 
significant
Year 
dummies
Constant 11.11*** 11.48*** 11.90***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 4,627 4,627 4,627
Number of individuals 989 989 989
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed t-tests
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Table 8. HLM analyses of effects of corruption propensity on venture performance
Logsales
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
First-level analyses:
Corruption propensity 
hat
1.07***
(0.03)
1.07***
(0.03)
Corruption propensity 
hat squared
-0.98***
(0.03)
Venture size -0.07***
(0.004)
-0.03***
(0.004)
-0.01***
(0.004)
No. of contacts 0.09***
(0.002)
0.05***
(0.002)
0.03***
(0.002)
Prior venturing 
experience
0.06***
 (0.008)
-0.03***
 (0.008)
-0.03***
 (0.007)
Informal economy 
distance
-0.01***
(0.001)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
General institutional 
distance
0.02
(0.02)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
Year dummy One 
significant
One 
significant
One 
significant
Second level 
analyses:
Informal economy 
distance
0.00
(0.00)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
General institutional 
distance
0.03
(0.02) 
0.04*
(0.02) 
0.04*
(0.02) 
No. of individuals 989 989 989
No. of observations 4627 4627 4627
Wald chi square 2339.07*** 4148.21*** 6006.62***
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, two-tailed t-tests
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